Individual-based simulations of the War of Attrition.
The War of Attrition model of John Maynard Smith predicts a single, mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for animal contests which are settled by conventional displays with no assessment of the opponent's fighting ability. We test the predictions of the model by simulating the evolution of strategies in a finite population of animals under various assumptions on how possible strategies are coded and mutated. While our simulations for the most part confirm the predictions of the model, we also discovered some significant deviations from the theoretically predicted ESS. Specifically, we found that if inheritance of strategies is somewhat imprecise, then a population can evolve that achieves on average a higher payoff than a population at the theoretically predicted ESS. Moreover, if the ESS is realized as a polymorphism of fixed persistence times, then for small populations, sufficiently stringent statistical tests will reject the hypothesis that these times are distributed as theoretically predicted.